



Wednesday, 19 April 1961,
 at 9 p.m.

New York

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Chairman: Mr. Adnan M. PACHACHI (Iraq).

AGENDA ITEM 13

**Report of the Trusteeship Council (A/4404)
 (*continued*)**

1. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) said that Liberia, an African State imbued with democratic traditions, would be proud to join with the Commonwealth countries, if they would accept, as a co-sponsor of the draft resolution on the accession of Tanganyika to independence (A/C.4/L.686).

2. The CHAIRMAN suggested that Member States wishing to become co-sponsors of the draft resolution on the accession of Tanganyika to independence should contact the sponsors directly before the item came before the Committee for discussion.

THE FUTURE OF THE CAMEROONS UNDER UNITED KINGDOM ADMINISTRATION (A/4695, A/4699, A/4726, A/4727; A/C.4/448, 479, 481, 482, 486, 487, 490, 493, 494; A/C.4/L.684/Rev.2, L.685 and Add.1) (*continued*)

3. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that a statement had been received from Mr. Mayi Matip, a petitioner and Chairman of the Parliamentary Group of the Union des populations du Cameroun. He proposed that the statement should be circulated to the members of the Committee.

*It was so decided.*¹

4. Mr. EDMONDS (New Zealand) explained the reasons which had led him to co-sponsor draft resolution A/C.4/L.685 and Add.1, and also his position on draft resolution A/C.4/L.684/Rev.2. His delegation had been glad to hear the French representative state at the 1150th meeting that his primary concern was to preserve the prestige of the United Nations. The New Zealand delegation, while moved by the same concern, had arrived at different conclusions.

5. The question at issue was not a quarrel between two States, and even less a quarrel between two African States, but a question of appraising the report (A/4727) of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, an official in whose competence both the General Assembly and his delegation had full confidence. It would therefore be out of place and unjust to intimate, as some had done, that the Commissioner could not judge the con-

duct and results of the plebiscite. The problem facing the Committee was whether the Commissioner's conclusions concerning the freely and secretly expressed wishes of the people were sound and whether the results of the plebiscite were valid. Attempts had been made in the Committee to show that the plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons had been invalid and that the results had been distorted by reason of the relationship between that part of the Territory and Nigeria. In answer to a question from the New Zealand delegation, the Commissioner had said at the 1145th meeting that, in carrying out his mission, he had borne in mind the condition and degree of separation between the Northern Cameroons and Nigeria and had nevertheless concluded that the results of the plebiscite should not be declared invalid. His delegation considered Mr. Abdoh the best qualified person to make such a judgement, especially when he had been paid unanimous tribute for the conduct of his mission in the Southern Cameroons.

6. To elucidate his position on draft resolution A/C.4/L.684/Rev.2, he reviewed the history of the question since 1958 and recalled, *inter alia*, that he had been one of the sponsors of the draft which had been unanimously adopted as General Assembly resolution 1282 (XIII). He found it strange that some delegations should have waited more than two years to declare that the objectives of the trusteeship had not been attained. At the resumed thirteenth session, the question of elections in the Cameroons under French administration had been the subject of an impassioned debate, and it had been decided, on the urging of the French representative and Mr. Ahidjo, that, in the case of that Territory, elections should not precede independence. In the case of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration, the question of elections had not been broached, but it had been decided that two plebiscites should be held, one in the southern part and one in the northern part, so that the Territory's future might be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people. Those decisions marked distinct stages in the development towards independence. It was common knowledge that the Northern Cameroons had been linked to Nigeria and that its separation from Nigeria, though it had to be attempted, could not be perfect in all respects. All the decisions adopted previously had made allowance for that reality.

7. His delegation was happy to submit a draft resolution which would enable the Cameroonian people to move from trusteeship to independence by uniting either with Nigeria or with the Republic of Cameroun. At its 1150th meeting the Fourth Committee had heard the Premier of the Southern Cameroons request the termination of trusteeship in order that his country might join with the Republic of Cameroun. Draft resolution A/C.4/L.685 acceded to that request. The New Zealand delegation would have preferred a simultaneous end to the trusteeship in both parts of the Territory, as early as possible. Unfortunately, circumstances in the South

¹ See A/C.4/496.

made a fairly late date necessary for that region. That, however, should not be regarded by the Committee as a reason for delaying independence in the Northern Cameroons.

8. He would vote against draft resolution A/C.4/L.684/Rev.2 because it was incompatible with the terms of the draft resolution which he was co-sponsoring. The dispatch of a commission of inquiry would be superfluous, as the report of the Plebiscite Commissioner gave full details on the plebiscite operations and on the separation of administration. He was also surprised at the new idea advanced in operative paragraph 3, for there had never before been any question of recommending legislative elections on the basis of universal suffrage in the Northern Cameroons before the attainment of independence.

9. He hoped that the General Assembly would adopt the draft resolution of which his delegation was a sponsor, for he regarded it as the best means of helping the people to move ahead and of preserving the prestige and influence of the United Nations and the role it might play in solving many varied and important international problems. It would be regrettable if the Committee were to set a dangerous precedent by rejecting the Plebiscite Commissioner's report and repudiating his conclusions, as was requested by some, on the basis of inadequately substantiated arguments.

10. He wished a prosperous future to the peoples of the Northern and Southern Cameroons and expressed the hope that the present differences of opinion would in the end bring the Republic of Cameroun and Nigeria closer together.

11. Mr. GASSOU (Togo) said that it was essential, at that stage in the debate, to place the question of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration in its true context. There was no truth to the claim that any criticism of the United Kingdom's administrative policies must necessarily reflect on the United Nations, for any past inability of the United Nations to defend the interests of dependent peoples, and particularly peoples of Trust Territories, had been due to the weightier influence wielded by the colonial Powers. That situation had come to an end—at least that was to be hoped—when the balance of power in the United Nations had been reversed to the disadvantage of the "colonial club".

12. His delegation refused to regard Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroun as contending parties in the present case; its sole wish was to find out who was really responsible for the situation.

13. The League of Nations, and later the United Nations, had placed the Territory under United Kingdom mandate and administration, but today the United Kingdom presented the world community with two territories, or rather two pieces of a single territory which had been split and despoiled by colonialist force. That fact could not be justified by saying that the two parts of the Trust Territory were inhabited by completely different populations which could not make up a single national entity, for the same situation had prevailed in all the Territories which had recently become independent African States. The problem had not arisen because of tribal differences but primarily because of the systematic policy of an Administering Authority that had never respected the personality and integrity of the Territories under its administration. Of all the Territories brought under international trusteeship, only

those that had been entrusted to the United Kingdom had never been able to retain their legal personality in becoming independent. On the other hand, the former Somaliland under Italian administration, the Eastern Cameroons, Eastern Togoland and various former colonies, which had if anything been less significant economically, demographically and geographically than the Territories under United Kingdom administration, had been able to obtain their independence while at the same time preserving their territorial integrity. Thus there was no reason why the same should not happen in the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration. One was tempted to ask whether it would not have been better for the Territories under United Kingdom administration to have remained mere colonies, the more so as they had not derived full benefit under the provisions of Article 76 b of the Charter. Indeed, 97 per cent of the inhabitants of the Northern Cameroons were illiterate, and it was impossible to find indigenous people who could serve as policemen, civil servants or even as heads of polling offices.

14. His remarks did not mean that the Togolese delegation was adverse to the attainment of independence by the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration. His delegation's position on that matter was very well known and would continue to be determined by the basic principles it held dear.

15. He paid a tribute to the dedication of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, and considered that the Trusteeship System should be terminated in both parts of the Territory on the same date.

16. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) recalled that the basic choice made by the Republic of Guinea was essentially an African choice, the main principles of which were African independence and unity. His delegation would consider the agenda item before the Committee from the point of view of the future progress of the African continent.

17. He recalled the partition of the African continent which had been made at the Congress of Berlin in accordance with the selfish interests of the imperialist Powers, and the division of the German colonies among the victorious Allies after the First World War. The African countries had no intention of reuniting the African territories either on the colonial basis or on a tribal basis, but would do so on an African basis in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. For Guinea, the idea of African unity did not involve any expansionist aims; it transcended all differences of language and could only be expressed in African terms. The future of Africa lay in large unions. Those would be in the form of entities incorporating such States as Nigeria and Cameroun that would be united for the greater good of the African peoples. The decision to unite the two parts of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration with the States which their peoples wished to join thus seemed to be a positive step.

18. The most important thing was the free choice of the peoples concerned. The peoples of the Northern and Southern Cameroons had replied differently to the questions put to them in the plebiscite. Some voices had been raised to dispute the regularity of the plebiscite. It could easily be understood that the Republic of Cameroun had desired the reunification of the former German colony as it had existed before the First World War. In that connexion it was interesting to note that all the political trends and personalities in the Came-

rooms had been in favour of that reunification. According, however, to the report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, the people had had the opportunity, both in the Northern and in the Southern Cameroons, to express their wishes freely and secretly concerning the alternatives offered in the plebiscite.

19. His delegation thought it vitally important not to undermine by unjustified criticism the authority of the commissions, the visiting missions, the commissions of inquiry and the plebiscite commissions which were sent by the United Nations to the various Territories. In present circumstances it had to be recognized that there was nothing to prove that the plebiscites had been vitiated by any irregularities.

20. The Republic of Guinea did not intend to take sides in the current debate. It did not think that there was any real dispute between the countries directly concerned, and it considered that the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration could accede to independence most expeditiously under the conditions indicated by the result of the plebiscites. The new situation thus created should strengthen the ties of all kinds which already united the peoples of Cameroun and of Nigeria. The people of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration would undoubtedly derive great benefit from their association with their brothers in the Republic of Cameroun and in Nigeria, for the greater good of Africa as a whole.

21. With regard to draft resolution A/C.4/L.684/Rev.2, he was glad that the original text (A/C.4/L.684) had been revised, since he would have had to object to operative paragraph 3 (b) of that text, the adoption of which might have delayed the Territory's accession to independence. Everyone knew that the essential aims of the Trusteeship System had not been fully achieved in any Territory. However, it was important to stress that all peoples were at all times capable of self-determination and that the prolongation of the colonial system was always against the wishes of the people and would not be in conformity with the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

22. Although his delegation endorsed draft resolution A/C.4/L.685, it thought that the Trusteeship System should be terminated in both parts of the Territory on the same date. In that way, there could be no question of terminating the Trusteeship Agreement for one part of the Territory before it had been united either to Nigeria or to the Republic of Cameroun in accordance with the wishes of the people.

23. He submitted an oral amendment to operative paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.685, to the effect that the words "at the request of the parties concerned" should be added after the words "to assist". The reason for that amendment was that in his view the Republic of Cameroun and the Southern Cameroons were quite capable of reaching agreement on the problems which directly concerned them.

24. It was in the light of those explanations that his delegation would decide how to vote on the draft resolutions before the Committee.

25. Mr. FARAHMAND (Iran) paid a tribute to Mr. Abdoh, the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, for the way in which he had carried out his task. He recalled that it was on the recommendation of the General Assembly that separate plebiscites had

been organized, under United Nations supervision, in the northern and southern parts of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration in order to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of the Territory concerning their future.

26. The report submitted by the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner (A/4727) showed clearly that the plebiscite had in fact been held under United Nations supervision and that the people had had confidence in the Commissioner and his staff. The Commissioner had stated in his report that he was satisfied that the people of the Northern Cameroons and of the Southern Cameroons had had the opportunity to express their wishes freely and secretly at the polls concerning the alternatives offered in the plebiscite.

27. Mr. Farahmand expressed his satisfaction with the security measures that had been taken in connexion with the voting. Although there had been some criticism of the way in which the elections had been conducted in the Northern Cameroons, his delegation was sure that the people of the Northern and Southern Cameroons had had the opportunity of expressing their wishes freely.

28. Under operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.685, the General Assembly endorsed the results of the plebiscite. He therefore hoped that that draft resolution would be adopted by an overwhelming majority and that the implementation of its provisions would enable the peoples of the Northern and Southern Cameroons to achieve their wishes.

29. Mr. TRAORE (Mali) said that the cause of the Cameroonian people, who had been fighting for many years for national independence and the unification of the Cameroons, was the cause of all the African peoples.

30. With regard to draft resolution A/C.4/L.684/Rev.2, he did not think that the General Assembly, after having adopted resolutions 1473 (XIV) and 1514 (XV), should wait until the next session before deciding on the fate of the Cameroons. It was high time to put an end to the trusteeship of the United Kingdom, which, for forty years, had deprived the people of the Cameroons of the advantages of culture, science and technology, as was proved by various passages in the report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner. To those who asserted that there had been intrigues and pressure to turn the scales in favour of one side or the other in the plebiscite, it could be said that the political, administrative and economic structures imposed by the colonial system had always made it possible, in colonial countries, for manoeuvres and measures of intimidation to be brought into play during elections. It had, however, to be conceded that the staff sent by the United Nations had carried out in an impeccable manner the tasks which had been entrusted to it by the General Assembly.

31. With regard to draft resolution A/C.4/L.685, he thought that 1 October 1961, the date fixed for the Southern Cameroons to join the Republic of Cameroun, was somewhat too late, particularly as there had already been at least preliminary contacts between the parties concerned.

32. He fervently hoped that the present debate would not lead to any misunderstanding or discord between the Republic of Cameroun and the Federation of Nigeria, as they would have to work closely together in order to help the peoples of the Northern and Southern Cameroons to progress rapidly in all respects. Each

of those two States would no doubt be anxious to set up truly democratic institutions in the Northern and Southern Cameroons so as to enable the people to unite in the work of national reconstruction. The struggle against the after-effects of colonialism in both parts of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration would enable the two neighbouring States to strengthen their ties in order irrevocably to overthrow all the barriers which the colonial system had raised in the hope of keeping the people divided.

33. Mr. TABIBI (Afghanistan) said that, having studied the report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, he felt that Committee should adopt draft resolution A/C.4/L.685. The report showed that the people of the Cameroons had been able to express their will freely, that political parties had been able to play their part and that there had been effective United Nations supervision. Even those who disputed the plebiscite results had never failed to praise the impartiality of the United Nations Commissioner, and the latter had declared repeatedly that the plebiscite had taken place in satisfactory conditions. To refuse to accept the plebiscite results would mean refusing to recognize the will of the peoples and disavowing the Plebiscite Commissioner, which would undermine the authority of the United Nations. The delegation of Afghanistan could therefore not support draft resolution A/C.4/L.684/Rev.2; the Committee should approve draft resolution A/C.4/L.685.

34. Mr. Tabibi hoped that the free will of peoples who were still struggling to achieve their independence in other parts of the world would soon prevail. To undermine the will of the peoples for purposes of political expediency was not in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and would bring discord among nations.

35. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) associated herself with the thanks expressed by representatives to Mr. Abdoh and his staff. She wanted the representative of Cameroun and the petitioners who had worked for the unification of the country to know that, although her delegation had decided to vote for draft resolution A/C.4/L.685, that did not indicate any lack of appreciation of their efforts.

36. She recalled that, when the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa, 1958, had recommended that the northern part of the Cameroons should be integrated in the Federation of Nigeria without a plebiscite (T/1426 and Add.1, para. 181), Liberia had opposed that suggestion and had asked, as it had previously done in the case of Togoland under United Kingdom administration, that a plebiscite commissioner should be sent.

37. She congratulated the peoples of the Northern and Southern Cameroons on the way in which they had taken part in the plebiscite. There had been some irregularities, but it would be unfair to hold the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner responsible for them. He had carried out his task with the greatest devotion to duty.

38. The fact that there was no trained staff in the Northern Cameroons at the time of Nigeria's independence was the fault of the Administering Authority. The United Kingdom had been concerned only to train staff in its colonies, and had neglected to do so in the Trust Territories under its administration. Her delegation also deplored the fact that the plebiscite had lasted two days.

39. She was pleased that the Northern and Southern Cameroons had shaken off the colonialist yoke, and she hoped they would succeed in remaining free from neo-colonialism.

40. She agreed with the representative of Brazil that it would be best to end the trusteeship in the Northern and Southern Cameroons on the same day, and she asked the sponsors of the draft resolution to take that into account.

41. She would not be able to vote for draft resolution A/C.4/L.684/Rev.2.

42. Mr. OKALA (Cameroun) said he wished to express his delegation's views concerning the report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner and concerning the Administering Authority's comments (A/C.4/479) on the Camerounian Government's White Paper on the plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons.² His Government was the first to acknowledge and to appreciate the disinterested efforts which the United Nations Commissioner had made throughout the plebiscite. The remarks he would have to make mainly concerned the organization of the plebiscite by the Administering Authority, and the way in which the latter had carried out General Assembly resolution 1473 (XIV). He had no intention of belittling the work of the Commissioner and his staff. In fact, the Camerounian Government's White Paper in many instances confirmed statements made in the Commissioner's report.

43. If the Camerounian delegation, in word and deed, had always confined itself to the problem of the Northern Cameroons and had seemed to ignore the case of the Southern Cameroons, that was not because the plebiscite results in the Southern Cameroons had been clearly favourable to the Republic of Cameroun. In the Southern Cameroons there was in fact a Camerounian Government, which alone was entitled to speak authoritatively on behalf of the peoples of that area. Moreover, neither the petitioners nor the Administering Authority denied that the plebiscite operations had been carried out in a regular manner in the Southern Cameroons. Only a few unimportant tribal groups refused to accept the verdict of the referendum. The reasons given for their refusal, however, were based not on any allegations of irregularity in the organization of the plebiscite, but on a determination not to submit to the majority decision. That was, to say the least, a strange idea of democracy.

44. With regard to Nigeria, he recalled that the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration had never been entrusted to any State except the United Kingdom, and the Trusteeship Agreement laid that down distinctly. Hence the Federation of Nigeria could not be a direct party to the debate: if the United Kingdom had transferred its responsibilities under the Trusteeship Agreement to the Northern Region of Nigeria, that was not only contrary to the provisions of the Agreement; it was also proof of a determination to integrate the Northern Cameroons in the Northern Region of Nigeria. That should have caused the United Nations to deprive the United Kingdom of the administration of the Territory.

² Republic of Cameroun, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Secretariat of State for Information, *Position of the Republic of the Cameroon following the plebiscite of 11th and 12th February 1961 in the northern portion of the Territory of the Cameroon under the administration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*.

45. On that point in particular he would like to give more details, because the United Kingdom's attitude had been decisive in that it had falsified the results of the plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons. In any case, the present situation in that part of the Territory was the direct result of colonialist policy. There was no need to recall that after the First World War the Cameroons, which until then had been united, had been divided into three parts. Since the Cameroonians had never been consulted about the division of their country, it would have been more logical to recognize *ipso facto* the territorial integrity of the country, especially at a time when the world was watching the collapse of an obsolete colonialism.

46. With regard to the report submitted by the Plebiscite Commissioner and the Administering Authority's comments and statements on the subject, he recalled that the plebiscite, in both the northern and the southern part of the Territory, was to have been held in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1473 (XIV), especially operative paragraphs 6 and 7, which laid down clearly the necessary conditions for the proper organization of the plebiscite and stipulated the guarantees necessary for a truly democratic vote in a Territory which was still dependent, with an illiterate majority and at the mercy of foreign domination. Since those conditions had not been fulfilled, the Government of Cameroun was entitled to accuse the Administering Authority of violating the Trusteeship Agreement, failing to implement General Assembly resolution 1473 (XIV) and making only a fictitious separation of the administration. All those violations, and the irregularities and omissions to which they had led, had distorted the plebiscite results and made it impossible for the peoples to express themselves freely.

47. The United Kingdom representative had tried to give the Committee the impression that the two parties to the dispute about the plebiscite results were, on the one side, the Republic of Cameroun and the petitioners favourable to it and, on the other, the United Nations Commissioner and the United Kingdom. In fact the disagreement was between the United Nations and the decisions it had taken, and the United Kingdom as the Administering Authority responsible for the Cameroons under its administration. Failure to implement resolution 1473 (XIV) of December 1959, which laid down the essential conditions for the plebiscite, and violation of the Trusteeship Agreement, were obvious irregularities, and the Administering Authority, in defending itself, should not treat the matter so lightly.

48. It was impossible for the Camerounian delegation to accept the results of the plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons, because firstly, the Administering Authority, in violation of the Trusteeship Agreement, had tried to take advantage of the administrative union between the Northern Cameroons and the Northern Region of Nigeria in order to annex the Territory to its former colony; and, secondly, the Administering Authority had not complied with the exact terms of General Assembly resolution 1473 (XIV).

49. With regard to the violation of the Trusteeship Agreement first of all, he recalled that the General Assembly, at the second part of its first session, had approved the draft trusteeship agreements only in the light of certain guarantees given by the Administering Authorities, including the United Kingdom. Those Authorities had undertaken not to consider the terms of the articles concerning administrative unions in the draft

trusteeship agreements as giving an Administering Authority the power to set up any form of association between a Trust Territory and adjacent territories involving any form of annexation of the Trust Territory.³ It was remarkable that it had been the representative of the United Kingdom who had submitted the proposal to that effect,⁴ since that country had certainly not applied the principle to the Northern Cameroons.

50. However, it might have been thought that the Northern Cameroons, being attached to the Northern Region of Nigeria, would have benefited from the development of the former British colony. In fact that had not happened, as the report of the Plebiscite Commissioner proved eloquently: the Northern Cameroons had 97 per cent illiteracy and few carriage roads; radio and telephone services hardly existed, and there was an almost complete lack of trained staff and administrative officers in the region. The result of the *de facto* integration of the Northern Cameroons in the Northern Region of Nigeria had not been to raise the peoples' standard of living and to further their development, but to prepare the ground for the annexation of the Territory to the neighbouring country. The practical outcome of the whole policy was that nothing had been done to encourage the territory's development, and Article 76 of the United Nations Charter had been violated. In short, after forty years of being under mandate and under trusteeship the Northern Cameroons had made no visible progress, presumably because the territory had not been directly administered by the responsible Power. The latter had transferred its responsibility to Nigeria, which was then its colony, in flagrant violation of the Trusteeship Agreement.

Mr. Ortiz de Rozas (Argentina), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

51. Mr. OKALA (Cameroun), continuing his statement, said that it was useless for the United Kingdom to try and justify its policy by referring to article 5 of the Trusteeship Agreement, as a mere comparison of the political, economic and social conditions in the Northern Region of Nigeria with those in the Northern Cameroons showed beyond a doubt that the Administering Authority had definitely not administered the Territory "as an integral part of its territory with such modifications as may be required by local conditions".

52. No steps had been taken to democratize or decentralize the administration. The same authorities had remained in office, the only elections being those of village chiefs by hamlet councils, some of the chiefs incidentally being still Nigerian nationals. In short, there was no justification for the flagrant differences which existed between the Southern Cameroons and the northern part of the Territory in that respect. The Administering Authority tried to justify itself by alleging that there were profound differences between the people of the two regions which were the results of their historical development. Even if that were true—and the 1959 plebiscite had shown such allegations for what they were worth—one would have to be excessively credulous to see that as a major obstacle to democratization. Not only were the village and hamlet councils the only elected assemblies, but in addition the method of election varied from district to district. Was it to those councils, elected on different principles and

³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second part of the first session, Fourth Committee, Part I, annex 22, document A/C.4/69, sec. IV, para. 6.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, Part II, p. 131.

indeed having half their members nominated, that the Administering Authority would transfer power when the Territory became independent? It was quite obvious that for the United Kingdom it had always seemed natural that the Northern Cameroons should join the Northern Region of Nigeria, which, in contrast, had an elected assembly and a government and enjoyed self-administration within the Federation of Nigeria.

53. The separation of administrations had also been fictitious, despite the guarantees which the General Assembly had tried to ensure for the plebiscite. The Nigerian officials serving in the Northern Cameroons had remained in office, except that they now were controlled from Mubi rather than from Kaduna. Other Nigerian officials had been detached from the civil service of the Northern Region and sent to the Northern Cameroons. It was clear they had been given a special task in the Territory, namely, to organize the plebiscite. It had been claimed that there were two authorities, a Plebiscite Administrator and an Administrator of the Northern Cameroons. But the Commissioner had shown what those claims were worth in paragraphs 321 and 322 of his report, according to which Sir Percy Wyn-Harris had combined the functions of Administrator of the Northern Cameroons and Plebiscite Administrator. Thus, if there were two authorities, they resided in one and the same person. With regard to the other senior official nominated by the Administering Authority, Mr. Johnston, his record showed that he had served for a long time in Nigeria, and it might legitimately be asked why he in particular had been chosen when the United Kingdom had no lack of capable colonial officials. Yet the Plebiscite Commissioner had warned the Administering Authority against sending to the Northern Cameroons officials whose long service in the Northern Region and known sympathies towards Nigeria might make them suspect.

54. Furthermore, no one had denied that, apart from the Administrator and his assistants, the senior officials in the civil service, the military command, the police and the technical services were all of Nigerian origin. The representative of Nigeria, while admitting that they were Nigerians, had said that they were under the authority of the United Kingdom. But that hardly meant that they had ceased to be Nigerians.

55. In seeking to justify itself, the Administering Authority had merely revealed its own incompetence: since it had not trained any qualified Cameroonians, it had had to call on Nigerians. The Commissioner's report was explicit on that point, stating that the administrative staff had been provided by the Government of the Northern Region of the Federation of Nigeria. The aim had clearly been not to tamper with the policy by which for forty years the Administering Authority had sought to annex a part of the Cameroons, the Northern Cameroons, to Nigeria. That was why it had refrained from appointing officials from the Southern Cameroons or from the United Kingdom civil service, or even United Kingdom or African officials from other British territories. The argument that such officials would not have been familiar with the local administration or able to speak the local language could not be upheld in view of the guarantees which the General Assembly had required from the Administering Authority and the conditions it had laid down to ensure impartiality.

56. From the foregoing it followed that the Administering Authority had flagrantly violated the Charter

and the Trusteeship Agreement, that it had deliberately omitted to undertake the decentralization and democratization ordered by General Assembly resolution 1473 (XIV) and that it had not carried out the separation of the administrations which was essential if the people were to express their wishes freely.

57. That policy had had the result sought by the Administering Authority. In that connexion the way in which the electoral lists had been established was quite significant. While in the Southern Cameroons the only electors were Cameroonians born in the Cameroons or whose father or mother had been born there, in the Northern Cameroons all the inhabitants, whatever their origin or nationality, could vote, provided they had resided in the Territory for six months. In addition, the electoral lists had been sent to Kaduna in Nigeria, despite the objections raised by the United Nations representative. Fearing that that procedure would have certain political implications, he had asked the Administrator to explore the possibility of having the list prepared in a neutral area. Admittedly, the election regulations were too complex to be fully understood by a people whose level of education was very low, but it might well be asked why the teachers and students at the training colleges at Baissa and Mubi and the various educational establishments in the Territory had not been considered capable of preparing the preliminary list of voters, as had been the case with other provisional lists.

58. As far as the protection and transport of ballot boxes was concerned, all the petitioners were agreed that, despite their objections, the Nigerian police had prevented the Cameroonians from checking what happened. It was rather curious to note that in the rare cases where the ballot boxes had been kept under watch by the Cameroonian delegates, the result of the plebiscite had been mainly favourable to the Republic of Cameroun. Examples of that kind were many and most of the statements by the Administering Authority had been flatly denied by the petitioners.

59. As for the conclusions to be drawn from those facts, some delegations maintained that the Committee must either adopt the conclusions of the Plebiscite Commissioner or repudiate the United Nations itself. That was a false dilemma. The Plebiscite Commissioner had carried out his task very well; the fault was not with the United Nations mission, but with the Administering Authority. The plebiscite organized in the Cameroons had entailed a preliminary condition which the Administering Authority had not been able to accept.

60. Other representatives had tried to set Cameroun and Nigeria against each other. That, however, was not the point, since there was no dispute between Nigeria and Cameroun. In any case the Camerounians had no desire to prevent Nigeria from having territorial ambitions. Certain States in Europe had played that game and it was their imitators who must be held responsible for any conflicts which might divide Africa.

61. The United Kingdom had tried to justify itself by claiming that the people had freely expressed their wishes. The United Kingdom representative, trying to prove how urgent it was to put an end to the trusteeship, had told the Committee that it was now too late to decide whether the basic aims of the trusteeship had been achieved or not. It must be made clear, however, that if the General Assembly was to take a decision on the problem at the present stage, it could do so only by answering yes or no to one question: had the basic

aims of the trusteeship been achieved in the Territory as a whole? The point at issue was, obviously, whether the people of the Territory as a whole—and not those of neighbouring territories—were capable of administering themselves and ready for independence.

62. Without wishing to deny that progress had been made in the Territory, he wished to stress that it could have been infinitely more rapid and extensive in the northern part if instead of administering the two regions separately, the Administering Authority had developed them together, if not as a single administrative unit, at least along parallel lines. If the Administering Authority could not be said to have failed seriously in its duty, it had at least committed a fundamental political error in protecting, through an excessive concern for local circumstances, the people of the Northern Cameroons from contacts which would have enabled them to make much more rapid progress. It was noteworthy that far from allowing the people to form an élite the United Kingdom system of administration had placed them under the domination of the neighbouring Nigerians. Since the Administering Authority had succeeded in establishing a body of trained Nigerians, it could have done the same in the Northern Cameroons.

63. Some people had tried to give the two plebiscites of 1959 and 1961 different meanings. It had been claimed that after the people had protested in November 1959 against a system of local administration, they had subsequently been given complete satisfaction by a reform of that system. It was stated further that the first vote was to be explained by the desire of the people for the democratization of the district councils and that the elections of June and July 1960, based on universal male suffrage, had satisfied them. It was surprising that anyone should have had to wait until the 1959 plebiscite to realize that the people had grievances to put forward. It was true that they had not been mentioned in the report (T/1426 and Add.1) of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa, 1958; on the contrary, it was stated in that report that there was such unanimity that it was not even necessary to consult the wishes of the people.

64. The representative of the United Kingdom had said that in order to give satisfaction to the peoples of the Northern Cameroons the local authorities of that region had been separated from those of Nigeria. If that was the case, it could justifiably be asked what would be the result of the union of that territory with Nigeria, if not simply a return to the *status quo ante* but without the protection which the International Trusteeship System had offered. The question was whether the United Nations had the right to leave those peoples to themselves, without advice or guidance.

65. The United Kingdom representative had also mentioned the reforms in the system of district councils and Native Authorities which had come into effect after a popular consultation on the basis of manhood suffrage. However, the report of the Plebiscite Commissioner left some doubt as to the exact effect of those reforms, and it might well be that if the Trusteeship Agreement was terminated the local ethnic minorities would no longer have any means of redress against the higher officials of the Native Authorities, who still exercised excessive power.

66. So far as the actual conduct of the plebiscite was concerned, he regretted that the complaints made in that connexion had too often been interpreted as being directed against the United Nations itself. He had

already emphasized that that was a wrong interpretation, and for that reason Cameroun would be glad to associate itself with a draft resolution taking note of the great difficulties which the Plebiscite Commissioner had had to overcome in carrying out his task and of the work which he had accomplished.

Mr. Pachachi (Iraq) resumed the Chair.

67. Mr. OKALA (Cameroun), turning to the draft resolutions before the Committee, said that the text in document A/C.4/L.684/Rev.2 had been submitted by African States which had attended the Brazzaville Conference and which hoped that the General Assembly would be able to take sufficient time to give due consideration to the problem as a whole. The other draft (A/C.4/L.685 and Add.1) had been introduced by the Indian representative (1149th meeting), who had stressed the advantages of an immediate decision and requested that two different dates should be fixed for the termination of trusteeship in the southern and northern regions of the Territory.

68. He recalled in that connexion that the Indian Government had always, as the debates on Togoland showed, argued that Trusteeship Agreements were one and indivisible. He believed that to follow the Indian representative's proposal would be to set a dangerous precedent which might give rise to a whole series of disputes. The Government of the Republic of Cameroun, for its part, stood by its view that the Trusteeship Agreement was indivisible: it was a single juridical instrument applying indissolubly to the two parts of the Territory, which constituted a single whole. Any decision providing for different dates for the termination of the Agreement in different parts of the Territory would require a modification of the Agreement and a new popular consultation in the Territory.

69. In addition, the Indian representative had argued that the union of the Northern Cameroons with Nigeria was a simple process, unlike the union of Southern Cameroons with the Republic of Cameroun. In the Indian representative's opinion that justified the choice of two dates and the suggestion to appoint a commission of three experts to be sent to the Southern Cameroons. If the abundant precautions which it was proposed to take on behalf of the peoples of the Southern Cameroons, despite the fact that they had reached an advanced stage of development and had their own Government and their own Assembly, were compared with the absence of such provisions in the case of the peoples of the Northern Cameroons it would be seen that there were grounds for questioning the objectivity of the sponsors of the draft resolution. Such a proposal was a flagrant injustice. It was to be hoped, however, that the United Nations had not been reduced to adopting decisions based on considerations of material interest, or to bowing to the will of one or another great Power. Quoting passages from the report of the Plebiscite Commissioner which indicated the fairly high degree of advancement reached by the peoples of the Southern Cameroons and the economic, social and educational backwardness of the Northern Region, he said that those examples cast doubt on the objectivity of the proposal introduced by India, which appeared simply to echo a suggestion made by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies; it was sad to see that the Indian delegation seemed to be taking its cue from the Government of the United Kingdom.

70. The right of self-determination and the right of peoples to make their aspirations known had no mean-

ing unless the peoples concerned were able to express themselves freely without being subjected to any physical or psychological violence. From the technical standpoint it was possible to maintain, as the Plebiscite Commissioner had done, that the consultation had been organized and conducted in accordance with the legislation promulgated. The fact, however, that the plebiscite had been marred by serious defects justified doubts as to the regularity of its results. That being the case, his delegation felt that the General Assembly should show at least as much solicitude for the peoples of the Northern Cameroons as was being requested of it for the peoples of the Southern Cameroons. It should organize a mission whose task would be to make an on-the-spot inquiry concerning the situation in the northern part of the Trust Territory, in the light of the report of the Plebiscite Commissioner, and to report to the General Assembly at its sixteenth session.

71. Some delegations had seemed to welcome the fact that the plebiscite had had different results in the two parts of the Cameroons which were under trusteeship, regarding it as an augury of good relations between Nigeria and Cameroun. It was to be feared that the way in which international problems had been settled in the last few years had accustomed Members of the United Nations to rough-and-ready settlements even where the future of large groups of people was at stake.

72. If the Government of Cameroun had been convinced that impartiality had been maintained, it would not have protested against the results of the plebiscite. The question was not one of claims but of simple justice. The petitioners would not be able to return to their homes because the same chiefs, the same Native Authorities, were still in office. If the United Nations refused to exercise the supervision which was its right it would be negating its own work in Africa. To make such a statement was not to challenge the Organization's decisions, but simply to ask that they should be reinforced by additional safeguards.

73. Mr. IGNACIO-PINTO (Dahomey) said that while he had unfortunately not been able to follow the entire debate, what he had heard sufficed to raise serious doubts in his mind concerning the way in which the General Assembly resolutions on the future of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration had been observed. There had unquestionably been irregularities with regard to the secrecy of the ballot which in other countries would have invalidated the vote. It was to be regretted that the Plebiscite Commissioner's report did not mention those defects of form and dubious operations, which should be brought out as evidence of the invalidity of the plebiscite. Moreover, the excuses which had been given to justify the fact that the administrative separation of the Northern Cameroons from Nigeria had not been effected had failed to convince him. There were weighty questions of conscience involved. Did the fault lie with Mr. Abdoh, the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner? Were the very principles of the United Nations unsound? The answer was no. No one was infallible. Mr. Abdoh had been sent to the Cameroons as an expert instructed to make a report. He had discharged his task admirably, considering all the unforeseen obstacles he had encountered. The members of the Committee, however, were not bound by his report. In order to dispel any doubts, the best solution would surely be to call for a second opinion. Objectivity must be exercised, for in the existing situation it seemed

impossible to take a decision. The Camerounian representative had made a moving appeal.

74. As a lawyer, he was not satisfied with the wording of draft resolution A/C.4/L.685, and could not accept it. If he had thought that the plebiscite had been conducted on a legally sound basis he would have been the first to vote in favour of joining Northern Cameroons with the Federation of Nigeria. It seemed to him unfair, however, that the same measures had not been applied in the Southern and Northern Cameroons. Doubts persisted, and the wise course would therefore be to defer a decision. His delegation would accordingly vote against draft resolution A/C.4/L.685, and would support resolution A/C.4/L.684/Rev.2.

75. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) said he had not been convinced by the arguments of the Camerounian delegation, and regretted Mr. Okala's remark to the effect that India was taking its cue from the United Kingdom. The Indian delegation had always voted in accordance with the dictates of its conscience, and had frequently had the courage to take a position opposed to that of delegations with which it was on friendly terms. Its actions were based on reason, not interest, and the Commonwealth in no way influenced its decisions. In any event the Commonwealth, as everyone knew, was widely divided on colonial questions. The Camerounian representative had described draft resolution A/C.4/L.685 as a draft resolution of India and the Arab League. India was proud to have co-operated on the present issue with certain of the Arab countries, and recalled that from the earliest days of the United Nations, it had associated itself with the members of the Arab League in the struggle against colonialism.

76. As to the statement made by the French representative at the 1050th meeting, he expressed great surprise that France should have waited until April 1961 to proclaim that the Administering Authority had not separated the Nigerian and Cameroonian administrations. Whenever that question had been discussed, India had insisted on the principle of separation, whereas France had supported the United Kingdom. He quoted in that connexion a statement made by the French representative on 23 May 1960, at the 1090th meeting of the Trusteeship Council, acknowledging certain historical, geographical, administrative and linguistic factors which he now denied. Nor could the Indian delegation accept the French representative's argument that the irregularities committed by 172 Nigerian police officers had invalidated the plebiscite as a whole.

77. So far as the accession to independence of the two parts of the Cameroons was concerned, he agreed with the representative of Cameroun that it would have been preferable to fix a single date, 1 June 1961. At the preceding meeting the representative of Brazil had said that he too thought the Trusteeship Agreement should be terminated simultaneously in the Northern and the Southern Cameroons. The sponsors of the draft resolution had decided to propose 1 October 1961 as the date for the independence of the Southern Cameroons because of the agreement reached in December 1960 (A/4727, para. 71) that immediately after the plebiscite, should the vote go in favour of joining the Republic of Cameroun, a conference would be held between the representatives of the Southern Cameroons, the Republic of Cameroun and the Northern Cameroons, and of the Administering Authority and the United Nations, to decide the date for the transfer of powers to a representative organ of the

new federation and the means by which that transfer was to be effected. The idea of such a conference, like that of the new federation, had originated not with his delegation but with the two parties concerned. It had therefore seemed to the sponsors of the draft resolution that account should be taken of the practical questions raised by the convening of such a conference. Mr. Foncha, the Premier of the Southern Cameroons, had even requested that the date should be postponed until 1 December 1961. The Indian delegation had objected and had insisted on 1 October; he hoped that the representative of Ghana, who at the previous meeting had proposed 1 November as the date, would not press that proposal.

78. The commission referred to in paragraph 6 of the draft resolution would not, he assured the Camerounian representative, in any sense be a political commission instructed to report to the General Assembly, but would simply be a commission of constitutional and administrative experts which would assist the parties concerned if they needed and asked freely for its assistance. The representative of Brazil had said that it should also be sent to the Northern Cameroons. He himself thought that no purpose would be served by such action, for the situation in that region was perfectly clear and the Constitution of Nigeria included provisions for the rights of minorities. Moreover, the commission's time would be rather limited—three or four months at the most—and it would probably not be able to go to the Northern Cameroons.

79. Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France), replying to the Indian representative, said that quotations should not be made out of context; but fortunately his own files were in order. He read out the passages quoted by the representative of India—passages taken from a statement which he, Mr. Kosciusko-Morizet, had made in the Trusteeship Council on 23 May 1960 (T/PV.1090)—and said that he could not agree with the Indian representative's assertion that full guarantees of impartiality had been provided. As far back as June 1960, moreover, the French delegation had expressed reservations on the subject of the Cameroons.

80. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) pointed out that the main contention of the representative of France now was that the Northern Cameroons did not possess organs of self-government such as a legislative assembly of its own. He recalled that in the past in the Trusteeship Council and elsewhere that very representative had opposed suggestions or recommendations to that effect. Even in May 1960 the representative of France had urged the United Kingdom to take over more and more direct administration of the Northern Cameroons in the following words: "This reproach which is being submitted here points to the fact that the Administering Authority is not administering sufficiently. In substance what is being said is this: will you administer and continue to do so wherever there are no local or national bodies which can administer the region? This is not a criticism; in fact it is a very flattering criticism if it is a criticism at all. We hope, however, that in October all these doubts will have been dispelled and that the General Assembly will be faced with a clean-cut situation."⁵

81. Mr. KORN (Austria), speaking on a point of order, moved the closure of the debate.

⁵ This quotation from the verbatim record of the 1090th meeting of the Trusteeship Council (T/PV. 1090, p. 38-40) was taken from the interpretation given during the meeting; no official translation was made.

82. The CHAIRMAN thought that the Committee might immediately take a vote on the draft resolution before it.

83. Mr. RAKOTOMALALA (Madagascar) asked why paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.685 provided for a commission of experts to be sent to the Southern Cameroons. The Southern Cameroons had, after all, replied in the affirmative when asked during the plebiscite if it wished to achieve independence by joining the Republic of Cameroun. If it acted on the basis of agreements which were outside its jurisdiction, the United Nations would, in a way, be penalizing the Southern Cameroons. In his view, private agreements between the Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroun were not the concern of the Committee, since the inhabitants had not stated their views on the subject.

84. He was very disappointed with the draft resolution that had been submitted by a number of States which he esteemed, including India, as certain passages therein constituted discrimination against the Republic of Cameroun.

85. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) said that he understood that the representative of India had accepted his amendment to paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.685. He would like a separate vote to be taken on the concluding phrase of operative paragraph 4 (a) which read "as a separate province of the Northern Region of Nigeria" and on the words "on 1 October 1961" in paragraph 4 (b). He had suggested that the date should be 1 June 1961 and, as the sponsors had not accepted that suggestion, he would abstain from voting. He also asked for a separate vote on the same words in paragraph 5 and on the words "into a Federal United Cameroun Republic" which appeared in the same paragraph.

86. Mr. OKALA (Republic of Cameroun) said that he could not agree to the two dates. His delegation considered the provision unconstitutional, since the fact that there was only one Trusteeship Agreement implied that trusteeship should be terminated throughout the whole Territory at the same time.

87. On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Cameroun, he said that his country would not receive any United Nations commission established under resolution A/C.4/L.685 since it considered that the United Nations resolution concerning the plebiscites had not been respected and his country did not accept to be under the trusteeship of the countries that sponsored the draft resolution.

88. Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France) said that if draft resolution A/C.4/L.685 was voted on first, he would like a separate vote on operative paragraphs 2 (a), 3, 5 and 6.

89. The CHAIRMAN said that he would put to the vote draft resolution A/C.4/L.684/Rev.2, since it had been submitted first.

90. Mr. TABIBI (Afghanistan), speaking on a point of order, proposed that, in order to save time, precedence should be given to draft resolution A/C.4/L.685 although it had been submitted after draft resolution A/C.4/L.684/Rev.2.

91. Mr. SALAMANCA (Bolivia) said that he was opposed to that proposal. In view of the interest that the question had aroused, he felt that the order of submission of draft resolutions should be respected; in the present instance, that would also mean respecting the minority.

92. Mr. KIANG (China) considered that rule 93 of the rules of procedure should be strictly applied. If priority was given to draft resolution A/C.4/L.685, his delegation would not take part in the voting on that draft.

93. Mr. TABIBI (Afghanistan) requested a vote on his proposal. He thought that the results of that vote would be the same as the results of any vote on draft resolution A/C.4/L.684/Rev.2, which should simplify the proceedings.

94. The CHAIRMAN took a vote on the Afghan proposal to give precedence to draft resolution A/C.4/L.685 and Add.1.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Nicaragua, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, New Zealand.

Against: Niger, Paraguay, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, France, Gabon, Haiti, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar.

Abstaining: Togo, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Honduras, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon.

The proposal was adopted by 41 votes to 28, with 18 abstentions.

95. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the preamble of draft resolution A/C.4/L.685 and Add.1.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Turkey, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia.

Against: Upper Volta, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, France, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal.

Abstaining: Cambodia, Haiti, Portugal, Spain, Togo.

Present and not voting: China.

The preamble was approved by 66 votes to 13, with 5 abstentions.

96. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote operative paragraph 2 (a).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Indonesia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, India.

Against: Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta, Belgium, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, France, Gabon.

Abstaining: Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Togo, Argentina, Cambodia, Greece, Haiti.

Present and not voting: China.

Operative paragraph 2 (a) was approved by 60 votes to 14, with 10 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 3 was approved by 59 votes to 15, with 10 abstentions.

97. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the words "as a separate province of the Northern Region of Nigeria" in operative paragraph 4 (a) of the draft resolution.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Upper Volta, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Ceylon, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Against: Upper Volta, Argentina, Belgium, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, France, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Italy, Ivory Coast, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal.

Abstaining: Brazil, Cambodia, Greece, Haiti, Liberia, Mali, Portugal, Spain, Togo.

Present and not voting: China.

The words were retained by 55 votes to 20, with 9 abstentions.

98. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) recalled that before the meeting she had informed the Vice-Chairman of an amendment by her delegation to operative paragraph 4 (b), whereby the words "1 June" would be substituted for the words "1 October".

99. The CHAIRMAN ruled that in those circumstances a formal amendment existed.

100. Mr. YOMEKPE (Ghana) pointed out that, at the 1151st meeting, he had suggested that the date of 1 November should be substituted for the date 1 October. If the Guinean delegation pressed for a vote on the date of 1 June, he, too, would submit a formal amendment.

101. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) said he was sorry he had not known that a formal amendment had been submitted. Had he been aware of the fact, he would have stated his own views on the subject and would have requested the Premier of the Southern Cameroons to do the same.

102. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) withdrew her amendment.

103. Mr. RAKOTOMALALA (Madagascar) reintroduced the Liberian delegation's amendment.

104. The CHAIRMAN said that the rules of procedure precluded the submission of an amendment after the voting had already begun. Any delegations which had felt that the date of 1 October 1961 required changing should have submitted a proposal to that effect in the days immediately following the submission of the draft resolution.

105. Mr. TRAORE (Mali) regretted the fact that the Liberian delegation had withdrawn its amendment. If the Committee voted against the date of 1 October 1961, the Assembly would be placed in an extremely difficult position, as it would have before it a proposal requesting independence for Southern Cameroons but not specifying any date.

106. Mr. OKALA (Cameroun) thought that separate dates could not be established for the accession to independence of the two parts of the Cameroons without amending the Trusteeship Agreement. As there was only one Trusteeship Agreement, there could not be separate votes.

107. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the words "1 October 1961" in operative paragraph 4 (b) of the draft resolution.

108. Mr. OKALA (Cameroun) strongly protested against a vote which he regarded as unconstitutional. He deeply deplored the fact that the United Nations seemed to be disregarding its mission and showing a servile deference to the directives of certain great Powers and particularly the United Kingdom and the United States. The delegation of Cameroun would not participate in the vote and would withdraw from the Committee room.

The words "1 October 1961" were approved by 50 votes to 2, with 12 abstentions.

109. Mr. KORN (Austria) and Mr. KANE (Senegal) stated that their delegations had not participated in the vote.

110. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the words "1 October 1961" in operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution.

Those words were approved by 50 votes to 2, with 12 abstentions.

111. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the phrase "into a Federal United Cameroun Republic" in operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Austria, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Burma, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia.

Against: Brazil, Ghana, Guinea, Italy, Mali, Argentina.

Abstaining: Bolivia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United States of America, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania.

Present and not voting: Austria, China.

The phrase was approved by 29 votes to 6, with 33 abstentions.

112. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote operative paragraph 5 as a whole.

Operative paragraph 5 was approved by 61 votes to none, with 14 abstentions.

113. The CHAIRMAN announced that the sponsors of the draft resolution had accepted the amendment to paragraph 6 proposed by the representative of Guinea whereby the words "at the request of the parties concerned" should be inserted after the words "to assist". He then put operative paragraph 6 as thus revised to the vote.

Operative paragraph 6 as revised was approved by 48 votes to none, with 17 abstentions.

114. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote draft resolution A/C.4/L.685 and Add.1 as a whole, as revised.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Liberia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia.

slovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon.

Against: Luxembourg, Paraguay.

Abstaining: Portugal, Spain, Togo, Argentina, Brazil, Cambodia, Greece, Haiti, Italy.

Present and not voting: China.

Draft resolution A/C.4/L.685 and Add.1 as a whole as revised was approved by 59 votes to 2, with 9 abstentions.

The meeting rose on Thursday, 20 April, at 3.15 a.m.